Abstract-Strongly fault secure logic networks are defined and are shown to include totally self-checking networks as a special case. Strongly fault secure networks provide the same protection against assumed faults as totally self-checking networks, and it is shown that when stuck-at faults are assumed a strongly fault secure network can be easily modified to form a totally self-checking network. A class of strongly fault secure networks is defined in terms of network structure. This structural definition of these "path fault secure" networks facilitates their design and implies other interesting properties. Finally, networks that are strongly fault secure with respect to single stuck-at faults are discussed. A large class of these networks is shown to be easily characterized, and network behavior under nonmodeled faults is considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
"C ELF-CHECKING" is a generic term used to describe logic networks that allow on-line detection of hardware failures. In recent years, several methods have been proposed for constructing self-checking logic networks [1] - [4] . These methods typically involve encoding network outputs in an error detecting code. A noncode output word indicates that the output is incorrect and that a fault is present in the network.
A widely studied type of self-checking network is the "totally self-checking" network first proposed by Carter and Schneider in [1] and later studied by Anderson [2] . The theory of totally self-checking networks is based upon certain assumptions regarding modeling of faults and the time interval that separates network faults. Given the fault assumptions, a totally self-checking network always produces a noncode word as the first erroneous output due to a fault. This behavior is obviously desirable and will be referred to as the "totally self-checking goal."
It is possible to construct logic networks that fail to be totally self-checking, but which achieve the totally selfchecking goal under precisely the same fault assumptions. Accordingly, we define the "strongly fault secure" property. Every totally self-checking network is strongly fault secure, and if stuck-at faults are assumed, every strongly fault secure network that is not totally self-checking can be converted into a totally self-checking network by simplifying its structure.
In order to construct strongly fault secure networks, it is necessary to consider characteristics of network structures and their associated output encodings. For this reason, we define the "path fault secure" property in terms of network structure and output codes. The path fault secure property implies the strongly fault secure property and has the advantage of being easily verified. Many different path fault secure network structures can be demonstrated, and a few examples are given.
Next we discuss networks that are strongly fault secure for single stuck-at faults since this is a frequently encountered fault model. A set of critical single faults are identified which lead to a sufficient condition for strong fault secureness that is less restrictive than the path fault secure property for single faults. A theorem then follows that allows some modification of strongly fault secure networks while preserving the strongly fault secure property. Finally, the effects of some nonmodeled faults are discussed.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Basic Definitions
We consider multiple-input, multiple-output combinational logic networks that are formed as acyclic connections of AND, NAND, OR, and NOR gates and of fan-out points. Inverters are considered to be single-input NAND The number of faults in a system is typically modeled as a Poisson process. Hence, it is assumed that members of a fault set F accumulate in G one at a time with some interval of time between. A critical assumption about the length of this time interval will be discussed shortly.
Because faults build up with time, we will denote this behavior by defining a fault sequence Kf1, f2, , fn> to represent the event where faultf1 occurs, followed later byf2 (at which point both f1 and f2 are present in the network), and so forth until fn occurs. It is assumed that once a line becomes stuck at 0 or 1, it remains stuck at that value.
Hence, in a fault sequence, if li /d efj then 1, does not appear as a stuck line in anyfk, k > j. If a stuck line were allowed to change its stuck value due to a later fault, our results would not be affected in any appreciable way, but notation would become more cumbersome. Since a fault affects the logic function realized by a network G, the output of G under input x and faultfcan be denoted as G(x,f ). Under the fault-free condition,f= 0, the output is G(x, 0). C. The Totally Self-Checking Property
The following definitions are due to Anderson [2] and refer to a functional block G with input code space A c X, output code space B c Y, and an assumed fault set F.
Definition 1: G is fault secure with respect to F if for all faults in F and all code inputs, the output is either correct or is a noncode word; i.e., for allfE F and for all a E A G(a, [5] . Also, the Rtransformation given in [6] is very similar. Informally, we letfbe the largest member of FM such that -ffandJcan be shown to be equivalent tofby considering the network's structure. If the faultf is not unique, then anyf can be used. Then the reduction of G with respect to f is a network G' with all the stuck lines infremoved, and with any gates whose output lines are stuck in f removed. If the reduction of a network forces the removal of a primary output line, then the output is assumed to take its stuck value in and is immune to any other faults.
Lemma 1: If G' is the reduction of G with respect tof, then
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward and can be found in [5] .
After a network has been reduced, several faults in the assumed fault set of the original network are no longer possible since they involve lines that have been removed. For this reason, we define a fault set F' for the reduced network to be the simplification ofthe fault set Fwith respect to the fault f, where F' = {fi ] fi E F and no stuck line in fi is a stuck line inf}. let G" be the final reduced network and F" be the final simplified fault set, then for all faults in F" there is some a E A such that G"(a,f ) =A G"(a, 0). Hence, G" must be TSC with respect to F" since k in Definition 4 must be 1 for all nonempty fault sequences.
In the remainder of the paper, our emphasis will be on the construction of SFS networks. Nevertheless, if TSC networks are desired for stuck-at faults we have shown that SFS networks can be converted to TSC networks via the reduction process.
Before we continue, some additional comments and observations are in order. First, the use of the reduction process in the design of TSC combinational networks is not entirely original with us; a restricted version was first proposed in [10] where untested AND gate inputs were removed from two-level AND/OR networks.
Second, the success of the reduction process is based on a stuck-at fault assumption. To be more specific, it relies on the fact that simulating the effects ofstuck-at faults results in a simpler network structure with fewer gates and lines. Consequently the reduction process must eventually terminate with a TSC network. For more general fault models, this may not be the case. An example of such a fault model is one that assumes gates can fail such that they realize any arbitrary logic function. For single faults of this more general type, a reduction-like process breaks down. Consider a gate that realizes the function g, and the gate failing to the function g' is an undetectable fault. The function g' can be at least as complex as g, and if we simulate the effects of the fault by replacing the gate with one that realizes g' then the new gate failing to the function g is undetectable. Hence, modification of the gate is again called for, and the process never terminates. On the other hand, for faults ofthis general type, bit-sliced network structures with parity codes (see Section IV-B) are SFS. This is evidence that if the fault model is general enough, it may be impossible to construct a TSC network while it is possible to construct SFS networks.
Third, one might ask if every fault secure network is strongly fault secure. If this were true, then the self-testing property in the TSC definition would be unnecessary, and a simpler definition of SFS networks would be possible. Unfortunately, it is not true. Any quadded logic network [7] is fault secure with respect to single faults. One can take nearly any quadded logic network with at least four levels and find a sequence of single faults that can lead to an incorrect code output prior to any noncode output while satisfying the two fault assumptions given earlier.
Finally, we should point out that if some particular mapping of noncode inputs is desired, e.g., if one wanted a code disjoint [2] network, then the reduction process may destroy this mapping. On the other hand, there are cases when it will not; the method for constructing TSC check circuits in [8] is such a case.
IV. THE PATH FAULT SECURE PROPERTY
A. Definition
The definitions of SFS and TSC networks consist of a functional description of their behavior under faults. However, in order to construct a network that is either SFS or TSC, one must be able to characterize SFS or TSC networks in terms of gate interconnection structures and codes. To this end, the functional definitions have little value.
In this section, we define the "path fault secure" property in terms-of network structures and codes. Path fault secure networks are a subclass of SFS networks, and can consequently be converted into TSC networks. The advantage of path fault secure networks is that their definition suggests techniques for their construction.
We begin by discussing a relationship between circuit structures and potential output errors using the well-known concept of path sensitization [9] . Path sensitization was originally used for single stuck-at fault detection. Here a 1-error) . For our example, the vectors are (n, n, n, n), (n, 0, n, n), (n, n, 0, n), and (n, 0, 0, n). Since the above argument was applied to an arbitrary fault sequence, it must hold for all. Consequently, Definition 5 is satisfied.
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To place the properties we have discussed thus far into perspective, Fig. 2 shows the relationships that exist among the sets of fault secure, strongly fault secure, path fault secure, and totally self-checking networks.
PFS networks enjay an advantage over TSC networks in that they have a concise definition in terms of network structure. Furthermore, verifying that a network is PFS is conceptually simple although an exhaustive verification of Definition 6 could be time consuming. Nevertheless, following sections show that networks can often be shown to be PFS without resorting to exhaustive verification of Definition 6.
PFS networks have another advantage when they are to be placed in a system. A network may be designed with an input code space A, but when it is placed in an actual system environment, it may actually receive some proper subset of A, say A', during normal operation. In this situation, a network designed to be TSC may fail to be TSC because some member of A -A' may be required to test for a modeled fault. On the other hand, a PFS network remains PFS as the following theorem shows. 
C1 B. Examples of PFS Network Structures
We now use the concepts introduced in the previous section to derive network structures that are PFS. We begin by considering unidirectional stuck-at fault sets.
A binary vector x covers binary vector y (x > y) ifx has a 1 in every position y has a 1. A code C is unordered if no member of the code covers any other member. Finally, an inverter-free network is just what the name implies; it contains only AND gates and OR gates. We can arrive at the same conclusion if a has 0's and n's only. Therefore, by Lemma 4, in an inverter-free network with an unordered output code space, for all b E B {b)Z(F)}'{b}uY-B.
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The use of inverter-free networks with unordered codes (typically m-out-of-n codes) have been suggested for realizing the combinational portion of TSC sequential machines [10] , [11] . We have just shown that such combinational networks must also be PFS.
The use of an inverter-free network forces restrictions on the input code space that can be used. However, it has been shown [12] that if an unordered input code space is used, then any mapping can be realized without inverters. Consequently, the use of unordered code spaces at both the input and output and' the use of inverter-free networks lead directly to PFS networks for unidirectional faults. The fact that it is sufficient for both code spaces to be unordered also aids in the interconnection of PFS networks.
Next, we turn to a set of network structures and output codes which lead to networks that are PFS with respect to single stuck-at faults.
A network is b-byte sliced if the outputs can be grouped into sets of b bits each such that each set is realized by an independent network having only primary inputs in common with the networks realizing the other sets. Fig. 3 illustrates a b-byte sliced network structure. A b-byte distance two code is a code in which the bits are grouped into bytes of size b such that if each byte is considered to be a single code position, then any two members ofthe code differ in at least two positions. Proof: Since no gates are used to form outputs belonging to more than one byte, all paths from any fault site to an output end at outputs belonging to the same byte. Therefore, a sensitization vector for any single fault can only have l's and 0's in the particular byte which the faulty gate is used to realize.
To avoid misunderstanding Lemma 5, one should recall that single faults are defined to occur at gate inputs and outputs; primary input faults are not explicitly included. c: There are a number of b-byte distance two codes. Checksum codes are perhaps the most widely known and have been proposed for constructing TSC adders [13] . Another such code is the distance two b-adjacent code [14] . A special case of this network structure/code is a bit sliced structure with a simple parity code at the output [2] , [15] .
Many other examples of path fault secure network structure/code combinations can be found. For example, a two-level network with maximum fan out of k is path-fault secure with respect to single faults if a distance k + 1 output code is used. This is because any sensitization vector for such a circuit can have at most a total of k l's and 0's.
V. SINGLE STUCK-AT FAULT SETS
We now discuss the SFS and PFS properties for single stuck-at fault sets. We choose to give single faults emphasis because they are perhaps the most commonly used fault assumption. We first develop a sufficient condition for a network to be SFS with respect to single faults. The condition is more general than the PFS property (more networks satisfy it), and it is computationally simpler to verify.
A structural network component of interest here is the single-output subnetwork. As the name implies, these subnetworks have just one output line and include so-called "tree" Fig. 1. subnetworks, i.e., those that contain no fan out. Also included are subnetworks with fan out, provided the fan out reconverges within the subnetwork. Fig. 4 shows various single-output subnetworks ofthe network shown in Fig. 1 . A single-output subnetwork is maximal ifit cannot be included in a larger single-output subnetwork. Now, let S be the set of maximal single-output subnetworks of the network G such that all the input lines of the subnetworks in S are primary inputs of G or fan outs of primary inputs of G. In Fig. 1 , S contains the subnetwork containing gates C, D, and E, and the single-gate subnetworks A and B. The maximal single-output subnetwork containing gates G and L is not in S because all of its inputs are not primary inputs. It can be shown that for a given network G, the set S is unique.
The criticalfault set Fc for G is the set ofall single stuck-at faults on the output lines of subnetworks in S. For Fig. 1, Fc consists of the six stuck-at faults on the outputs ofgates A, B, and E. In general, the size of Fcis much smaller than the set of single faults Fs as suggested by the above example.
Lemma 6: For all x E X and for allfE Fs G(x,f) e {G(x, 4) © X(Fj)} (note the different subscripts on F).
Proof: The set of single faults can be partitioned into two sets: those that are on a gate in a subnetwork in S, and those that are not.
Sayf is a single fault on a gate in a subnetwork belonging to S with output line Ic. All sensitized paths fromfmust pass through Ic. Consequently, it follows that any set ofsensitized paths from f must -be implied by u({lJ1}) u ({l/jO}) c X(Fc), and for all x E X G(x,f ) E {G(x, 0) © X(Fj)}. Proof: The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2 except that Lemma 6 is used in place of Lemma 3 . 0
The network of Fig. 1 points out the utility of Theorem 7.
That is, it is only necessary to show that the network is PFS with respect to six single faults in order to conclude that it is SFS with respect to all single faults, of which there are 84. The theorem is also useful when it comes to constructing SFS networks. This is because it allows a wider variety networks than the PFS property. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 which shows a portion of a network used to realize the outputs 11 and '2 of a SFS network. There is a path from We now present a theorem that allows an SFS network to be modified while retaining the SFS property.
Theorem 8: Let G be a network that is PFS with respect to Fc, and let N be any single-output subnetwork in G. If any irredundant network realizing the same function as N is substituted for N, then G is still PFS with respect to F,.
Proof: If the replaced subnetwork is included in a member of S the sensitization sets for the faults in F, remain unchanged, and the theorem follows.
If the replaced subnetwork is not in a member ofS, the fact that it is irredundant can be used to show that there cannot be a path from any of its inputs to its output with odd (even) inversion parity if the original N did not have such a path with odd (even) inversion parity. Consequently, all paths through the replacement have a counterpart in the original with respect to inversion parity. Therefore, the sensitization set for F, in the modified network must be a subset of the sensitization set for F, in the original network, and the theorem follows. D1
Since F, C F C F_,it is easy to see that if a network is PFS with respect to F,, it is PFS with respect to F,. Therefore, the inverter-free networks discussed earlier are PFS with respect to Fc, and Theorem 8 can be applied to them. In particular, inverters can be introduced by substituting NAND or NOR equivalents for individual gates, or for larger single-output subnetworks. Various simplifications (e.g., converting two inverters on a line to a simple line) are also possible.
Another consequence of the theorem is that complex "gates," such as EXCLUSIVE-OR'S and multiplexers, can be used in the design of PFS networks regardless ofthe way the "gates" are finally implemented; inversion parities are simply determined from the functional definitions of the "gates."
Networks that are PFS with respect to F, also offer protection against a much larger variety offaults than single stuck-at faults. Let F, be the set ofall multiple stuck-at faults whose components are all located within the same singleoutput subnetwork of G. Proof: If a unateness preserving fault causes a primary output error, it must first cause an error on the output line of a single-output subnetwork to which the fault belongs. Hence, the erroneous output is the same as if the output line were simply stuck, and must therefore be a noncode word. If the fault causes no primary output errors, an argument similar to the one used in Theorem 8 can be used to show that the faulty network has a Y(F,) that is a subset of I(F,) in the fault-free network. In Theorem 8, this followed from the fact that the new network was irredundant and realized the same function as the original. Here, it follows from the unateness preserving nature of faults.
By the very same argument, it follows that each subsequent member of Fp either yields only noncode outputs or correct outputs, or results in a network that is PFS with respect to F,. Calling on the definition of a strongly fault secure network completes the proof. D VI. CONCLUSIONS In this paper we have presented a class of networks that are a superset of the class of totally self-checking networks, and which provide exactly the same protection against modeled faults under the same assumptions.
Key properties of these strongly fault secure networks are as follows. 1) They offer a complete characterization of all the networks that achieve the totally self-checking goal under the two assumptions that are fundamental to most selfchecking methods.
2) Assuming stuck-at faults, any strongly fault secure network can be easily converted to form a totally selfchecking network. Hence, any methods used to build strongly fault secure networks would apply equally well to the construction of totally self-checking networks.
3) When other than stuck-at faults are assumed, it may at times be impossible to build a totally self-checking network, while a strongly fault secure network can be built. 4) In order to have general methods for constructing self-checking networks of any kind, one must be able to characterize self-checking network structures. This has been an obstacle to the construction of totally self-checking networks. However, for strongly fault secure networks such characterizations can be rather simple as the sections on path fault secure networks show.
5) The class of strongly fault secure networks that we defined to be path fault secure have the property that they can be embedded in a system where they only receive some subset of their input code space during normal operation, and they are still path fault secure.
6) A large class of strongly fault secure networks are easily characterized under the single fault assumption. These networks can be shown to offer protection against a large variety of faults other than single faults.
A final property that some strongly fault secure networks may have which we have not discussed is the following: 7) Although one might infer that modeled faults that go undetected in a strongly fault secure network are accidental, 498 this is not necessarily the case. In particular, the class of strongly fault secure networks includes networks that contain intentional masking redundancy [7] , and which have the property that when the redundancy "wears out," all errors are noncode words that indicate the unprotected condition of the system 
